Un-Buzzed

For the time being, I've disabled my Google Buzz account. It's not because I have privacy issues with Google - others, however, might. And although I've tried to secure my Buzz account and - more important - my contact list, although I've really enjoyed the rapid increase in followership, although I've even on the brink of declaring Buzzing the new blogging...

...apparently, I need some more time to figure out all the implications that come with Buzz.

I do think that Google Buzz has enormous potential beyond the scope of most other social networks; actually, I think Buzz could be the first social network I could actually use for serious work and serious fun.

I'll be around, watching this thing closely. But since I have other things to do as well, I'll let others figure out how to use Google Buzz. You are more competent than I am. You know who you are.

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Filed under  //  Google   privacy  
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Posted 1 month ago

It's the End of the Net As We Know It

Undifferenziert müßte ein Access-Provider genauso wie ein Blogger ausnahmslos jederzeit sämtliche Inhalte kontrollieren, da er dafür verantwortlich sein soll, »die Einbeziehung und den Verbleib von Inhalten im Gesamtangebot«, die entwicklungsbeeinträchtigend sind, zu verhindern. Hier stellt sich die Frage, welcher User kann dies mit den ihm möglichen Mitteln sicherstellen? Der Freizeit-Blogger wird hierzu regelmäßig nicht in der Lage sein. Ihm steht das technische Equipment und gegebenenfalls Know-how kaum zur Verfügung. Ob er sich parallel die eingreifende Filterung durch einen Access-Provider wünscht, ist gleichfalls fraglich.
From German ISP 1&1's official weblog, via schockwellenreiter.de

Seriously, German readers: After the federal government's more or less failed attempt to restrict unfettered access to the Internet to fight child pornography (or so they said until everybody and their Supreme Court said that this might be censorship), it is now a new version of Germany's Jugendmedienschutzstaatsvertrag which is supposed to provide legal foundation for content control. 1&1, as everybody of you may or may not know, is one of Germany's leading ISPs, and together with AK Zensur Internet activists, they are not too happy with the draft legislation.

While this may turn into another legal battle, it is definitely reason enough to once again look into ways of circumventing a possible future access control infrastructure.

Which brings us to the topic of Private VPN. I've been a supporting member of SDF for years, and I've been using their VPN service - not to protect myself from official sniffers, but to keep any eavesdropper off my communication while I'm on public WLANs, such as in airports. Now I might start using VPN access (which tunnels all your Internet communication securely to the provider's server, which, in SDF's case, is far beyond the reach of German legislators) from home as well, and for good. Not because I'm perusing illegal or merely indecent content - just because it's nobody's business.

Other, possibly easier-to-use VPN providers include Witopia, YourPrivateVPN and PureVPN. Note that I haven't tested any of these, and that all of them charge for their services.

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Filed under  //  Internet   privacy  
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Posted 1 month ago

I Shall Not Be Scanned

Nacktscanner ist eigentlich ein Wort für ein Gerät, das Menschen an Flughäfen bis auf die Haut durchleuchtet, um verborgene Waffen und Sprengstoffe zu finden. Nacktscanner sind aber auch Politiker, die Menschen im Namen der Sicherheit bis auf die Haut ausziehen wollen - am Flughafen, im Internet, in ihrer Wohnung. Jeder neue Terroranschlag, jedes versuchte Attentat ist Wasser auf die Mühlen der politischen Nacktscanner.
Michael Spreng, sprengsatz.de

Translation: Body scanners [literally: naked people's body scanner] literally are devices to scan people at airports for hidden weapons and explosives. But body scanners are also politicians who want to undress people in the name of security - at the airport, on the Internet, in their apartments. Each new terror attack, each attempted assassination is water to the mills of political body scanners.

I consider myself a frequent flyer. Actually, this is less spectacular than it used to be: bimonthly crossings of the Atlantic oceans and weekly cross-country flights have long been replaced with weekly short-haul flights. Still, I'm walking to metal detectors and being padded down more often than I deem it necessary.

This might change - if Germany's federal government actually proceeds with plans to install body scanners at all of the country's airports - never mind that experts are doubtful of the effectiveness of body scanners (article in German); never mind that Israel's El Al airline has a near-perfect security track record without body scanners.

I, too, want to be safe when flying. The 9/11 hijackers could have been prevented from destroying the World Trade Center and, partially, the Pentagon through body scanners. But that was in a different world where box cutters were as good as admitted to airplane cabins. More recently, the so-called shoe bomber and the Nigerian who tried to bring down a Delta airplane before New Year would have passed even the most developed scanners available today without problems. Body scanners may serve a purpose - I suspect it is the scanner producing industry's rather than anything else. But that might just be me.

So here's my resolution for 2010: Since I live in a relatively small country with a (relatively) reliable high-speed railroad infrastructure, I will fly less and travel by train more often - if necessary, up to 100 % of my in-country trips. And with the introduction of body scanners at my local airport, I will officially renounce my frequent flyer status.

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Filed under  //  privacy   security   terrorism  
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Posted 2 months ago